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1.  Towards a “Rediscovery of Europe”? 
In the past decade European Studies became a growth industry in the 
Asia-Pacific.
1 European Studies programs and research facilities have 
been set up in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, China and 
South Korea, some of them with considerable support provided by the 
European Commission. More recently, similar centres and programs have 
been established in Australia and New Zealand. In consonance with these 
developments, several national Associations for European Studies and a 
network linking the Western Pacific were formed. This “rediscovery of 
Europe” (Holland 1999) constitutes a departure from previous priorities 
in the fields of research and education which in the process of nation-
building and the search for an indigenous national identity accorded 
attention to Europe only as the colonial villain and the culprit for many of 
the political, economic and social anomies which marked the post-
independence era in the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Suthipand Chirathivat/Poul Henrik Larsen (eds.): European Studies in Asia… New 
Challenges and Contributions to the Understanding Between Asia and Europe. Workshop Proceedings, 
Bangkok: Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University 1999.   2
A number of reasons account for the “European Renaissance”
2 in the 
Asia-Pacific. They can be found in the region itself as well as in changes 
of Europe’s foreign policy agenda. To begin with the European side, the 
upgrading of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty of Maastricht has 
undoubtedly helped to sharpen the contours of an European foreign 
policy identity and, with it, a tendency be become a more assertive and 
more outward looking international player than hitherto.  
Yet, it is safe to assume that the main impetus for Europe’s renewed 
presence in the Asia-Pacific came from the twin experience of Asia’s 
economic boom and Europe’s doom in the 1990s. While East and 
Southeast Asia – and by OECD standards – Australia and New Zealand, 
too, enjoyed unprecedented economic growth, Europe went through a 
protracted recession with high rates of structural unemployment. While 
Europe was preoccupied with its own problems such as the 
transformation of Eastern Europe, enlargement, completion of the Single 
Market and paving the way for the Economic and Monetary Union, its 
complacent attitude toward the Asia-Pacific and, by coincidence, other 
world regions, abruptly changed with APEC’s first summit held in Seattle 
in 1993. The summit sent shock waves through Europe, the more so as it 
                                                 
2 In reference to the concept of an “Asian Renaissance” coined by former Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim.   3
was preceded by the ratification of NAFTA through the US Congress. 
Both events conveyed to Europeans the message of a seeming American 
policy shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific and a gravitational shift in the 
world economy. 
These geopolitical and geoeconomic changes were paralleled by 
stiffening Asian resistance against Western and, in particular, European 
conditionalities
3 which became part and parcel of the EU’s relationship 
with the non-Western world after the end of the East-West conflict. 
Rejecting Western universalism, which many saw as an attempt to erect a 
new Western value hegemony and as thinly veiled protectionism 
designed to block he rise of Asia’s high performing economies, the Asian 
side responded with collective identity-building based on cultural 
relativism. The Asian value hypotheses became a frontal challenge of 
Western concepts of political, economic and social order and set the tone 
for an “Asianization of Asia” (Funabashi). Politicians, academics and the 
media ritually designated the 21
st century the “Pacific Century” and 
predicted “Asia’s rise to the sun” (Mahbubani 1993). A causal 
relationship was established between the Asian economic miracle and 
Asian values which were seen as more in tune with the demands of 
                                                 
3 These include democratic forms of government, observation of human rights, disarmament, market-
oriented reforms and development-orientation.    4
globalization than the sclerotic, overly legalistic and bureaucratized, 
laggard and decadent Europe (Rüland 1996). 
While the persistent treatment as a pathological case, which found ample 
expression in frequent references to the “European disease”, helped to 
pave the way for neoliberal inroads into the European societal discourse, 
mounting fears of losing out in the world’s economically most dynamic 
region and an urgently felt need to counter what was perceived as grossly 
misleading cliches of the Asian value hypotheses, Europeans launched a 
new cultural offensive in the Asia-Pacific region. While the EU policy 
document  “Towards a New Asia Strategy” (European Union 1994) 
displayed a strong economic bias, educational, scientific and cultural 
activities were regarded as an important complementary device to 
improve Europe’s image in the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), inaugurated by the Bangkok Summit in March 1996, provided 
the institutional framework for these policies, which received a further 
boost with the establishment of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in 
1997. The European Asia strategy went hand in hand with a similar foray 
into American universities as a result of the New Transatlantic Agenda, 
with the Commission earmarking   US $ 10 million for the establishment 
of EU Studies in the States (Holland 1999:28). By the mid-1990s it had 
finally dawned to Europeans that mastering globalization requires a   5
multi-faceted and sophisticated presence in the Triad’s core regions. In 
fact, educational, cultural and scholarly activities have become important 
prerequisites for building up “soft power” (Nye 1990), which nowadays 
must be considered a crucial resource in the Triadic struggle over the 
agenda and the definition of the rules in global multilateral fora. 
Yet, promoting European Studies also held some attraction for decision-
makers in the Asia-Pacific. The profound changes in Europe’s political 
landscape after the collapse of socialism, persistent fears over a Fortress 
Europe and diversion of European investment and aid from developing 
countries to Eastern Europe, seemed to suggest to Asian governments that 
domestic expertise on Europe may be a valuable asset in their interactions 
with the EU. Thus, despite the contentious value debate and a similar set 
of grievances in the area of trade, it is interesting to note that Asians were 
more responsive to the European overtures than New Zealand and, to a 
lesser extent, Australia. Even long after the devastating consequences of 
Asian crisis had become evident, New Zealand, for instance, was still 
preoccupied with her efforts of building a Pacific identity. In institutional 
terms this policy has found its expression in the remarkable contribution 
Australia and New Zealand made to the creation and development of 
APEC and – as far as scholarly research is concerned -- the establishment 
of think tanks and study programs related to the Asia-Pacific. In New   6
Zealand the APEC Study Centre in Auckland, the Asia Studies Institute 
and the Asia 2000 Foundation must be named in this context.  
Geography has not changed after the Asian crisis. What, however, has 
changed in the Asia-Pacific, is the general environment for small 
countries like New Zealand to find partners for the pooling of bargaining 
power in major global fora. With APEC in disarray, limited prospects for 
new regional groupings such as the P 5 and the Western Pacific Forum, 
the slow progress of negotiations for an ASEAN-CER free trade 
agreement and bilateral free trade agreements, such as the one recently 
concluded with Singapore, and new Asian cooperative arrangements 
under the auspices of ASEAN+3, which is an EAEC
4 in disguise and, in 
effect, excludes Australia and New Zealand, as an external observer one 




2.  Studying the EU – How and What? 
The Joint Declaration on Relations between the EU and New Zealand of 
May 1999 is one sign of cautious reorientation. The establishment of the 
                                                 
4 The proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), later renamed into East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), was first launched by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhamad in late 
1990. It was designed as an East Asian regional bloc able to represent Asian interests in transregional 
fora such as APEC and in global multilateral fora. It explicitly excluded all Anglo-Pacific countries, 
including Australia and New Zealand. 
5 Which so far mainly concentrated on relations with Latin American countries. Ibid., p.4.   7
Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch is another. Yet, for the Center, given finite personal and 
material resources, the question invariably arises what should be studied, 
how, for whom and to what end. Before addressing this question in 
greater detail, a few preliminary remarks must be made. 
Although a sharp thematic profile might be desirable for an institution 
like the CRE, under the above-mentioned circumstances, it makes 
probably more sense to opt for a wider approach that integrates many 
disciplines and thus encourages interdisciplinary work. At the same time 
the Centre’s research program should strike a reasonable balance between 
basic and applied research.  
While this always entails the danger of ending up with a laundry-list of 
projects, a small country such as New Zealand can hardly afford a degree 
of specialization as larger countries. However, a certain degree of 
prioritization of research topics may contain this danger. 
This said, the following priorities may be considered: 
One priority area should be the EU. This, of course, is a deliberate choice 
for contemporary themes. The EU is undoubtedly the engine of political, 
economic and social change in Europe. It increasingly represents 
European interests in the world and the growing weight of its policies has 
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a major impact on the interests of non-members. The fact that New 
Zealand’s interests are tangibly affected by the EU not only, but 
particularly, economically, and that academic expertise on the EU is 
rather scarce and scattered, qualifies EU Studies as major focus for the 
Centre’s research activities. 
Research on the EU should be built around the four core disciplines of 
Political Science, Economics, Law and History. This concept basically 
follows the European Study Centres set up in various parts of Asia during 
the 1990s with the assistance of a Consortium of European Universities.  
While without EU Studies the Centre would probably sooner or later face 
a legitimacy problem, this priority must not become a procrustean bed. 
As a catalyst for European research topics, the Centre should tap and 
promote whatever scholarly talent and interest is devoted to Europe – in 
the University of Canterbury, but if suitable also through cooperation 
with other institutions in New Zealand. This opens up a broad range of 
topics far beyond the EU.  
As far as the above-mentioned core disciplines are concerned, other 
European cooperative arrangements such as CEFTA, the Council of 
Baltic Sea States, EFTA, the Black Sea Cooperation or the various forms 
of transborder cooperation, as exemplified by the Euroregions, may be 
studied. Other topics could include the violent conflicts on Europe’s   9
periphery, foreign policies and domestic societal developments in 
individual European countries. 
The latter would provide ample opportunities to bring in additional 
disciplines such as sociology, geography, anthropology, literatures and 
languages. These disciplines could perhaps be summarized under the 
heading of cultural studies. While cultural studies may be at variance with 
utilitarian concepts of research, they open up valuable insights into 
Europe’s major societal discourses in such fields as fine arts, fiction and 
the mass media. To claim that such reflections of the “Zeitgeist” do not 
have a marked impact on policy formulation and policy outcomes is 
tantamount to subscribing to a rather narrow concept of politics. 
As a political scientist I am not in a position to comment on the whole 
gamut of very legitimate research concerns in the field of European 
Studies. I believe that there is much time left for in-depth group 
discussions tomorrow in which the various disciplines could formulate 
their own research priorities in the context of their resources and 
capacities. I will therefore limit myself in the next few minutes to a 
further elaboration of what could be topics in EU research. While, again, 
there exists a plethora of very legitimate and interesting topics, none of 
which should be excluded beforehand, a major criterion for my   10
assessment is the potential benefit for New Zealand in its interactions 
with the EU.  
 
2.1. External Relations and CSFP 
As the EU develops international actor qualities in an increasing number 
of policy fields with an intensifying presence in a growing number of 
international fora and issues, in-depth expertise on the Union’s external 
relations and the CFSP must constitute a key interest for a non-member 
such as New Zealand. This includes the analysis of institutional changes 
such as recently the creation of the Office of a High Representative for 
the CFSP, the impact of these changes on policy- and decision-making, 
and their effects on the dynamics of interaction between member 
governments, transnational groups and European institutions.  
Studies of this kind would basically address the internal dimensions of 
Europe’s foreign policy formation, as they have to assess to what extent 
the foreign policymaking process sheds its intergovernmental character 
and moves forward toward the supranational end of the integration 
process. For non-members this transformation may have profound 
consequences. The more this is the case, the more the EU ceases to 
provide scope for two-level political games. As the Europeanization of 
the CFSP and external relations proceeds, one may expect increasing   11
difficulties for non-members to exploit divergent national member 
interests through the instrumentalization of bilateral state-to-state 
relations. 
More specifically, the CRE could focus on case studies of the EU as an 
international actor. As globalization proceeds and with it the border-
crossing nature of an increasing number of policy matters, there is a 
tendency for the continued multilateralization of international relations. 
From the perspective of New Zealand one very obvious arena of interest 
in this respect is the WTO. Since 25 percent of the country’s wealth 
hinges on agriculture and agricultural exports, it is persistently at 
loggerheads with the EU and the latter’s reluctant liberalization of its 
agricultural policies. This provides ample rationale for studying the EU as 
an actor in the WTO, her strategies, negotiation techniques, 
communication patterns, coalition-building and policy results. 
Closely related to this topic is the relationship between the EU and the 
Cairns Group. The lack of bargaining power of a small country vis-à-vis 
powerful economic blocs such as the EU prompted New Zealand to join 
the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters. Yet, very little is known over 
how and with what effects the Cairns Groups represents its interests in 
and vis-à-vis the EU.    12
It is now conventional wisdom that globalization and regionalization 
complement each other. In fact, globalization has been a major force 
behind the so-called New Regionalism which saw a proliferation of 
regional organizations from the mid-1980s onward. Driven by Brussels, 
which seeks to rationalize its external relations by increasingly moving 
towards bloc-to-bloc dialogues, gave rise to the emergence of inter- and 
transregional relations. Though adversely affected by the Asian crisis, 
these inter- and transregional dialogues may assume important 
intermediary functions in an emerging system of global governance by 
serving as agenda-setters and clearing houses for global multilateral fora. 
While the major powers of the Triad are involved in at least two such 
relationships, New Zealand is only a member of APEC. Due to a 
membership moratorium, neither New Zealand nor Australia can hope in 
the near future to be admitted to ASEM. Yet, although ASEM, like 
APEC, is struggling to rise on top of its talk shop image, the Asian-
European relationship has a definite impact on New Zealand’s immediate 
perimeter of interests as it increases policy options of her Asian neighbors 
in the same way as it limits the scope of her own choices. After all, 
ASEM has strengthened Europe as a competitor of New Zealand in Asian 
markets.   13
Another topic to be placed in this context is the EU’s policy of 
negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with major countries such as 
South Africa and Mexico as well as regional organizations such as the 
MERCOSUR. While from a European perspective these are results of the 
intensifying global economic competition with the United States over 
market shares and rules, such bilateral agreements may jeopardize New 
Zealand’s trade interests in many ways. Their consequences may even be 
exacerbated as New Zealand’s own may negotiations to establish free 
trade arrangements with Pacific Rim countries proceed sluggishly.  
While these are areas where European and New Zealand interests may 
diverge and therefore, from New Zealand’s perspective, deserve intensive 
research, there are others where interests converge. One such area is 
development aid. Through its long-established link to the ACP states, the 
EU and New Zealand share a common interest in the development of the 
South Pacific islands. Yet, they also share an interest in the eradication of 
poverty in Asia as well as an avid concern for halting the disruptive social 
consequences of the Asian crisis such as separatism, religious strife and 
uncontrolled migration. This common interest rests on a strong 
foundation of shared values such as popular participation, democracy, the 
observation of human rights and sustainable development. They are 
perceived as prerequisites for conflict prevention and stability. As donor   14
countries have considerably scaled down aid in recent years and, contrary 
to their overarching common interests, tend to involve themselves in turf 
fights over political influence in recipient countries, studies on the EU’s 
development policies, especially if focussing on Asia and the Pacific, 
could help pave the way to a more coordinated development policy 
between the EU, New Zealand and possibly also Australia for the benefit 
of the target groups.  
Shared interests also exist in the area of security. Although the EU may 
not and perhaps should not play a major security role in the Asia-Pacific, 
it is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and therefore an 
actor with potential influence on New Zealand’s security perimeter. 
Although the ARF has yet to evolve into a full-fledged security regime 
for the Asia-Pacific, there is definitely a rationale to study the European 
role in the ARF. One is to secure European acceptance for New Zealand’s 
nuclear free policy, the other is the growing potential for cooperation in 
peace-keeping efforts. European efforts to form a rapid deployment force 
coincide with New Zealand’s, albeit controversial, moves to restructure 
its army into a peace-keeping force. Yet, the peace-keeping capacities of 
both could be brought to good use in conflicts on the doorsteps of both 
sides. A third rationale for studying security issues is the evolving nature 
of the European defence identity itself. To understand European security   15
policies requires a good grasp of the institutions, the apparatus and the 
decision-making procedures in this policy field. 
 
2.2 Internal developments of the EU 
The previous discussion should have indicated clearly that understanding 
the EU’s policies presupposes sufficient knowledge about the Union’s 
internal dynamics. The evolution of the EU’s system of governance 
should thus be an essential part of any research program on the EU. 
Institutional changes will have a direct bearing on the power equation 
within the EU, the EU’s policy output, access to EU decision-making 
bodies and the channels to influence them and must therefore be carefully 
studied.  
Of particular interest in this respect may be the ongoing debate over the 
EU’s democracy gap. Recent reforms strengthening the European 
Parliament, the introduction of the subsidiarity principle and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights approved in Nice have partially addressed this 
criticism. In fact, the EU can by now be considered the most 
democratized international organization and thus set a precedent for 
others to follow. With the influence of the legislative powers in the EU on 
the rise, the study of European elections, decision-making in the 
European Parliament, the embryonic Europeanization of the political   16
party system and the incremental emergence of a European public space 
may be important topics to study. 
For several reasons, the enlargement process should likewise be of 
particular interest: First, it changes the institutional set up, second, it may 
directly affect New Zealand’s economic interests, and, third, relatively 
little is known in the country about the Eastern European applicants for 
membership. 
Given the economic stakes involved, from New Zealand’s perspective the 
study of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy must be a priority field of 
research. However, it is very obvious that this kind of research must rest 
on a strong interdisciplinary base and involve strong economic and legal 
expertise. Apart from this, it is self-evident that topics such as the EU’s 
trade relations, trade relations between New Zealand and the EU and the 
Monetary Union are a domain of economists. 
As the EU pursues a cooperation concept that is characterized by a high 
level of legalization and contractualism, with the rapid growth of the 
acquis communitaire European law becomes an increasingly diversified 
and demanding field. Knowledge of the European law, the legal 
procedures and the thrust of decisions made by the European Court of 
Justice thus increasingly determine success and failure of transactions in 
Europe and with Europe.   17
Finally, the CRE should not neglect the theoretical dimension of EU 
studies. The EU has throughout its existence strongly inspired theoretical 
discourses on international relations. Functionalism, neofunctionalism 
and new institutionalism have been developed with the EU as empirical 
frame of reference. Studies about the impact of international norms, rules 
and institutions on the behavior of states, the degree regional 
organizations develop actor qualities, and the way the EU contributes to 
the evolution of structures of global governance could be theoretical 
issues of interest. 
 
3. Conclusion 
All these research topics must be grounded on a solid historical 
foundation and proficiency in European languages. Beyond the 
interdisciplinary approach, the Centre must develop capacities for the 
diffusion of its know how and networking with other institutions. 
Diffusion of know how involves several activities which need not be 
spelled out here in detail as there can be drawn from the experiences of 
the Centres established earlier in the Asia-Pacific region. Diffusion of 
know how includes a leading role of the Centre as an initiator and 
coordinator of teaching courses on Europe at various levels of university 
education (undergraduate and graduate). European Studies should   18
produce a broad basis of Europeanists who are able to competently staff 
key positions shaping New Zealand’s relations with Europe in fields such 
as diplomacy and government, business and cultural relations. Moreover, 
the Centre should act, as organizer of special lectures, seminars and 
conferences on Europe, be involved in the training of multiplicators such 
as teachers and journalists on Europe and stimulate the activities of the 
local European Studies Association. A high-profile publication program, 
briefings for political decision-makers, diplomats and other public 
officials with a hand in European affairs, a regular media exposure as 
well as the establishment of a documentation unit, which ideally should 
also be accessible through the web, are additional activities that may be 
expected from the Centre. 
Taking into account the limited resources and the geographical location, a 
successful networking policy is crucial for the Centre’s sustainability. 
Networking has at least three major dimensions:  
At a first stage, networking needs to be facilitated through university 
partnerships, exchange programs for scholars and students, joint 
postgraduate programs and research agendas and conferences. This is 
probably an area which can be moved forward with relative ease as the 
ongoing activities of the Centre indicate.    19
Second, in the area of teaching, networking can be facilitated through 
long-distance learning programs on Europe, either in cooperation with 
other universities in the Asia-Pacific or, more preferably, with European 
and American partners. E-seminars would constitute a cost-effective 
approach to a considerable broadening of available teaching expertise and 
allow for the introduction of topics into the teaching program that may 
not be covered locally. 
A third stage is network building at a higher plain. While New Zealand’s 
national Association for European Studies is already linked to the Asia-
Pacific network, it must be borne in mind that the Asia-Pacific network is 
still relatively weak in terms of organization as well as resource 
endowment. A closer cooperation or perhaps even a tutelary relationship 
with North American associations may be considered.  
Fourth, very essential is the close relationship to representatives of the 
European diplomatic community, the EU Delegation in Canberra and, 
probably more difficult, to representatives of European institutions in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. Their cooperation is not only crucial for the 
sustainability of the program, but they may also serve as resource persons 
for research projects that necessarily must rest on solid field work. 
Finally, the sustainability of an institution such as the Centre hinges very 
much on the long-term commitment of the European Commission and, in   20
particular, the university. In order to carry out systematic research a 
predictable resource flow is needed. The neoliberal spirit that has 
permeated universities in many parts of the world may have developed 
the entrepreneurial skills of faculty members, but also increasingly 
distracts them from what they are able to do best: competent research and 
good academic work. 
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